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         NOT PRECEDENTIAL 
 
 UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
 FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
 ___________ 
 
 No. 13-3975 
 ___________ 
 
SHIRLANDO A. COOKE, AKA Shirlando Cooke, AKA Shirland A. Cooke,  
AKA Loyd Collins, AKA Lloyd Collins, AKA Shirlando Coke, 




ATTORNEY GENERAL OF THE UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 
                                                                                                  Respondent  
____________________________________ 
 
 On Petition for Review of an Order of the 
 Board of Immigration Appeals 
 (Agency No. A075-816-217) 
 Immigration Judge:  Honorable Margaret R. Reichenberg 
 ____________________________________ 
 
 Submitted Pursuant to Third Circuit LAR 34.1(a) 
February 13, 2014 
 
 Before: AMBRO, SHWARTZ and SCIRICA, Circuit Judges 
 







 Shirlando A. Cooke petitions for review of the Board of Immigration Appeals’ 




 Cooke is a citizen of Jamaica and a lawful permanent resident of the United States.  
He has three New York state drug convictions that he concedes render him removable for 
having been convicted of a controlled substance violation.  His only conviction at issue 
on review is a 2006 New York conviction of attempted third-degree robbery in violation 
of N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 160.05.  The Government charged him as removable 
on the basis of that conviction as well, asserting that it constitutes the aggravated felony 
of attempting to commit a theft offense.  See 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), (U).  Cooke 
remains removable for his drug convictions, but conviction of an aggravated felony 
would render him ineligible for cancellation of removal, see 8 U.S.C. § 1229b(a)(3), 
which is the only form of relief he seeks on review.
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 Cooke was represented by counsel before the IJ.  He argued that his attempted 
robbery conviction does not qualify as a “conviction” for immigration purposes because 
it was actually a youthful-offender adjudication under N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 720.10-
.35.  The IJ granted Cooke multiple continuances to obtain evidence that he was so 
adjudicated, but he did not present any such evidence and the IJ ultimately concluded that 
Cooke was instead convicted as an adult.  The IJ also concluded that the conviction was 
for an aggravated felony and that Cooke is thus ineligible for cancellation of removal.   
 Cooke appealed and raised his youthful-offender argument before the BIA, where 
he proceeded pro se after counsel withdrew his appearance at Cooke’s request.  Cooke 
                                                 
1
 Cooke also applied for asylum and other relief on the ground that he fears mistreatment in 
Jamaica.  The Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied those claims for a number of reasons, but Cooke 
did not challenge those rulings before the BIA and has not challenged them on review.  Thus, 
they are not before the Court and we will not address them further. 
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also filed a motion for reconsideration with the IJ in which he presented additional 
evidence, and the IJ transferred it to the BIA.  The BIA dismissed Cooke’s appeal and 
denied his motion after agreeing with the IJ that Cooke presented no evidence that his 
attempted robbery conviction was actually a youthful-offender adjudication.  Cooke 
petitions for review pro se. 
II. 
 The Government argues that we should dismiss this petition for review because, 
regardless of whether Cooke has been convicted of an aggravated felony, his conviction 
of controlled substance violations triggers the statutory provisions limiting our 
jurisdiction to constitutional claims and questions of law and that Cooke has raised none.  
See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D).  With the possible exception noted below, however, 
we conclude that Cooke has raised reviewable claims and will address his arguments. 
 Cooke raises essentially two arguments on review, but they lack merit.  First, 
Cooke argues that the BIA deprived him of due process because it “did not even bother to 
inquire about [his] status as a ‘youthful offender,’” gave “no rational legal basis” for its 
decision, and failed to “develop the record.”  The BIA, however, squarely addressed and 
rejected Cooke’s arguments in that regard.  Cooke does not specify anything that he 
believes the BIA overlooked, and our review confirms that the BIA adequately explained 
its ruling. 
 Second, Cooke takes issue with the substance of the BIA’s ruling.  In particular, 
he argues that his attempted robbery conviction was really a youthful-offender 
adjudication, that it thus does not constitute a “conviction” as defined in 8 U.S.C. § 
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1101(a)(48)(A), and that the BIA’s conclusion to the contrary conflicts with its decision 
in In re Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. 1362 (BIA 2000).  In Devison-Charles, the BIA 
held that a youthful offender adjudication under New York law does not constitute a 
conviction for immigration purposes.  See id. at 1373.  In that case, however, the alien 
“submitted certified court records to establish that he was adjudicated a youthful offender 
under Article 720 of the New York Criminal Procedure Law.”  Id. at 1363.  Cooke, by 
contrast, submitted no such evidence here.
2
 
  The documents before the IJ included a state court “Certificate of Disposition—
Superior Court Information” reflecting Cooke’s guilty plea to attempted robbery and an 
order denying his motion for post-conviction relief.  (A.R. 514-520, 524.)  Neither 
document mentions a youthful-offender adjudication, and the latter expressly refers to a 
“conviction.”  If Cooke had been adjudicated a youthful offender for his attempted 
robbery offense, then his conviction would have been vacated and “[a] youthful offender 
finding . . . substituted for the conviction.”  Devison-Charles, 22 I. & N. Dec. at 1367 
(citing N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law §§ 720.10(4) & 720.20(3)). 
 The only mention of a youthful-offender adjudication appears in a document that 
Cooke submitted with his motion for reconsideration, which concerns a previous 2006 
adjudication for assault that was not charged as a ground for removability or otherwise 
                                                 
2
 Although reviewing the Agency’s finding that Cooke was not adjudicated a youthful offender 
arguably entails a factual rather than a legal inquiry, we will conduct it both to further explain 
why the BIA did not deprive Cooke of due process and to reach the legal question of whether its 
ruling conflicts with Devison-Charles.  See also Jordon v. Att’y Gen., 424 F.3d 320, 325 n.8 (3d 




put at issue in this case.  That document is captioned “Certificate of Disposition—
Youthful Offender Adjudication,” and it specifies that “defendant was adjudicated to be a 
youthful offender” for the assault offense and that “a youthful offender adjudication is 
not a judgment of conviction for a crime or any other offense[.]”  (A.R. 20) (emphasis 
added).  The “Certificate of Disposition—Superior Court Information” for Cooke’s 
attempted robbery offense, by contrast, contains nothing of the sort and suggests nothing 
other than that Cooke was convicted as an adult for that offense.   
 Thus, the BIA’s conclusion that Cooke’s attempted robbery offense resulted in a 
conviction rather than a youthful-offender adjudication is amply supported by the record.
3
  
Consequently, the BIA’s decision in this case did not conflict with its decision in 
Devison-Charles.  Cooke does not otherwise contest that an attempted robbery conviction 
under N.Y. Penal Law §§ 110.00 and 160.05 constitutes an attempted “theft offense” 
aggravated felony under 8 U.S.C. § 1101(a)(43)(G), and we see no immediately apparent 
                                                 
3
 Indeed, we question whether Cooke was even eligible for youthful-offender status on his 
attempted robbery offense in light of his previous adjudication as a youthful offender for his 
assault offense under N.Y. Penal Law § 120.05, which is a felony.  See N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law § 
720.10(2)(c) (rendering ineligible for youthful-offender status a youth who “has previously been 
adjudicated a youthful offender following conviction of a felony”).  Cooke, relying on People v. 
Zepada, 87 A.D.2d 747 (N.Y. App. Div. 1982), argued before the BIA that his attempted robbery 
conviction was a youthful-offender adjudication because the trial court made his sentence for 
that conviction concurrent with the sentence for his previous youthful-offender adjudication for 
assault.  Cooke has not raised that argument on review, but even if he had we would reject it.  
Zepada holds that, notwithstanding N.Y. Crim. Law § 720.10(2)(C), New York trial courts have 
the discretion to award youthful-offender status for two separate felony offenses if the defendant 
is convicted of those offenses on the same day.  See Zepada, 87 A.D.2d at 748.  In this case, 
Cooke was adjudicated a youthful offender for his assault offense on April 12, 2006, but was not 
convicted of his attempted robbery offense until June 22, 2006.  (A.R. 20, 524.)  In any event, 
even if the trial court had the discretion to adjudicate Cooke a youthful offender for his attempted 




basis to question the Second Circuit’s holding that it categorically does.  See United 
States v. Fernandez-Antonia, 278 F.3d 150, 161-62 (2d Cir. 2002). 
 For these reasons, we will deny Cooke’s petition for review.  The Government’s 
motion to dismiss the petition for lack of jurisdiction is denied as well.  
